Tristan Newsome 260372334 December 1 2011 New Media COMS 340 Professor Christine Mitchell TA: Caroline Bem
Introduction
This exhibit will present an examination of Electronic Voting Systems. The exhibition will present the historical development of voting systems and discuss the technical structure of electronic voting systems followed by an analyses of its uses and applications. Furthermore, this paper will examine the controversy surround electronic voting systems, noting both the positive and negatives implications of the voting systems. Conclusively, this exhibition will analyze electronic voting systems through a theoretical lens and deliberate its effects on western democracy and society as a whole. It is the intention of this exhibit to demonstrate that electronic voting systems are underdeveloped and lack the necessary security measures to be trusted with processing our electoral results and thus determining our democracy.
History
Historically during the time of Athenian democracy, voting was practiced through a simple show of hands. The tally would essentially be eye-balled and the verdict made by an adjudicator. However, the growth of populations inevitably made this practice an ineffective means for tallying the votes of individuals. Eventually a physical paper ballot form of voting was adopted, through which voters would clearly mark their preferences and the ballots would then be tallied in order to determine the result. This practice has been effective to date, and many countries still practice this traditional way of voting. For example, in Canada , federal elections are strictly physical ballots, and no form of electronic voting is permitted. All the votes are physically tallied by Elections Canada representatives. However, over the past 2 decades, neighbouring countries have began to adopt and embrace a new form of voting. This new form of voting is called electronic voting systems, or e-voting.
The term electronic voting systems is a blanket term that encompasses a wide variety of ways in which elections are carried out and votes are finalized and tallied. In fact, many electronic voting systems actually include physical ballots. These systems are called punched card systems or optical scan voting systems. The origins of the punched card system can be traced back to Herman Hollerith who patented the process in 1889 and used punched cards to compile data for the U.S Census (procon.org). However, punch cards weren't used in the voting process until 1964. Before that period, there were multiple other systems developed for voting including the wide spread adoption of lever voting machines (similar to a gambling slot machines). The first lever machine was used in 1892 in New York and was called The Myers Automatic Booth (A brief Illustrated History of voting, Jones)
The lever voting system was the dominant voting system until the 1960s when the optical scan voting system was adopted. The first optical scan system was developed by IBM in the 1930s and was used to score tests like the S.A.Ts. However, the system was not modified for election purposes until 1962. Despite the fact that these machines weighed up to 15,000 pounds, they became a popular means of voting around the American west coast (Jones). Different variations of the optical scan voting systems were developed and implemented up until the 70s. In 1974 the first direct recording electronic voting system was patented by a team of researchers including Richard H. McKay, Paul Ziebold, James Kirby, Douglas Hetzel, and James Syndacker (Jones).
Electronic Voting Systems and D.R.E
DRE has an electronic screen, that may include mechanic mechanisms (buttons/levers) or more popularly, modern touch screens. The system contains software that tallies and secures the votes. The software is different depending on which company has developed the machines; the prominent Diebold corporation labels its central software GEM. Diebold's GEM software is responsible for recording over 40% of the American populations votes (Hacking Democracy, Ardizzone, Michaels, Carrillo Cohen). The votes are processed and then saved onto memory cartridges. After the election is over, election officials at the various precincts send the cards to a central location for the final tally.
The DRE system and other electronic voting systems have been very popular around the world. They are used in the India , Switzerland and municipal Canadian elections. However, they are used most prominently in Brazilian elections. They were first adopted by Brazil in 1996 and by 2000 they were the main mechanism used for recording votes. However, the DRE system is also used largely in American elections. As stated by the Congressional Research Service, "most voting systems used in U.S. elections rely on computers in some way. The most computerized is the direct recording electronic voting machine, or DRE. In this system, votes are recorded directly onto computer memory devices" (Eric A. Fisher, Kevin J. Coleman 2).
Criticisms of Electronic Voting Systems
The report written by the Congressional Research Service addresses the many concerns voters have had about electronic voting systems and direct recording electronic devices since the 2000 presidential election between presidential candidates Al Gore and George W. Bush, and the 2004 presidential election between George W. Bush and John Kerry. In both these elections, reports of electoral fraud were prominent. During the 2000 election in Volusia County , Florida , a DRE system in one of the precincts recorded Al Gore had a negative 16,000 votes. Washington Post journalist Dana Milbank reported that "although there is no evidence that the first round of results was wildly inaccurate, the problems in counting votes here are systemic. The underlying causes are not fraud or corruption, but lax state oversight, inadequate funding, out-of-date technology, poor training - and general ineptitude. On election night, the disappearance of 16,000 votes was caused by faulty memory cards. Six precincts couldn't transmit their results because of computer problems, and the county's returns were delayed until 3 a.m" (http://cache.boston.com/news/politics/campaign2000/news/Tight_race_reveals_cracks_in_system+.shtml).
This is one report amongst many that point out the inaccuracies of the electronic voting systems and DRE systems during recent elections. The documentary team of Simon Ardizzone, Russell Michaels and Robert Carrillo Cohen provide a critical in-depth analysis of electronic voting systems in the United States in their documentary "Hacking Democracy". The documentary casts a disturbing light over electronic voting systems, especially those manufactured by the Diebold company. The team highlights several incriminating factors surrounding the corporation, namely that many of the individuals on board of directors have republican ties. This information would help to explain that most system malfunctions seem to favour republicans over democrats. In fact, several key advisors of then presidential candidate John Kerry had a panel of software analysts ready to proceed with an investigation against Diebold's DRE system in the case of fraudulent electoral results. Consequently Kerry did not seek legal action or request an investigation.
The documentary provides an excellent metaphor which helps to portray the implications of electronic voting systems: for example, what if when a voter went to cast their ballot, they were forced to enter a booth that resembles the confessional booth of a church. In that booth there is a man behind a curtain whom the voter informs of their choice. That man records everyone's vote then tallies them up at the end of the election and provides the public with what he assures to be an honest and accurate tally. In this light, the advancement of electronic voting systems seems absurd. Of course one may argue that the man cannot be neutral while the computer is completely free of partisan bias. This critique would be acceptable if the programs and software that the computer operates weren't developed by ideologically partial human beings. Conversely, the conclusion of the film proves that the memory cartridges that the DRE systems use to record and save the votes can be tampered with, and more importantly, that the tampering is invisible and untraceable. These conclusions coincide with various critiques of electronic voting systems.
One such critique was made by a team of computer scientists and software analysts from John Hopkins University . They stated that: "Using publicly available source code, we performed an analysis of the April 2002 snapshot of Diebold’s AccuVote-TS 4.3.1 electronic voting system. We found significant security flaws: voters can trivially cast multiple ballots with no built-in traceability, administrative functions can be performed by regular voters, and the threats posed by insiders such as poll workers, software developers, and janitors is even greater. Based on our analysis of the development environment, including change logs and comments, we believe that an appropriate level of programming discipline for a project such as this was not maintained. In fact, there appears to have been little quality control in the process" (Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin,Wallach 21). The problem with determining the true flaw in Diebolds software is that under intellectual property laws, their software and source code is protected. As such, only those within the corporation itself possess access to the software's details.
For many software analysts and computer scientists, this lack of transparency lies at the heart of the issue. The text "Hacker Practice" by E Gabriella and Alex Golub provides an insightful discussion into the issue of open software and the detriments of copy righting. In the article, hackers are framed in "terms of the hacker commitment to information freedom and meritocracy as well as their mistrust of authority, and their firm belief that computers can be the basis for beauty and a better world" (Gabriella and Golub 256). This description of hacker advocacy elegantly sheds light on the negative implications of electronic voting systems. Because true democracy is supposed to be the embodiment of freedom and transparency, then the mechanisms through which it is achieved should also embody these values. However, as demonstrated above, this is not the reality. Diebold and other corporations produce and develop electronic voting systems and the software that run the systems in complete secrecy. It must not be forgotten that these are profit-making enterprises and their revenue is the most important factor of their business; it is not their priority to protect the sanctity of our democratic values and to insure open and fair elections. While their reputation may depend on the success of these factors, if they can avoid blame while cutting corners off programming and security costs, then it is certain they will do so.
However, if we may take a liberty in assuming that electronic voting system producers are not completely malevolent in their pursuit of profit, there have been many suggested ways in which to drastically improve the security of software programs like Diebold's GEM. One such option is developing the software like GEM as an open source software (OSS ). "OSS differs from free software in its message, a semantic revaluation tactically used to attract investors. Advocates of OSS [...] argued that open source is a superior development model for making software, in contrast to traditional approaches that used copyrights and patents. OSS [...] [is] not only the right thing to do; it [is] also the more efficient thing to do. OSS 's ethical virtues were made manifest in the fact that the enjoyment of programming and the reputation one derived from doing it well were simply better incentives to produce good software than a salary. [...] today, corporations spend millions of dollars developing and advertising OSS " (Gabriella and Golub 262). The proposition of open source software is a viable solution to fixing Diebold's security flaws in their software. More importantly however this process would hit 2 birds with 1 stone. Not only would the system be improved at a relatively low cost and high return, but it would effectively put to rest transparency concerns. Everyday citizens would be able to look at the software and understand how it works, and thus have a better understanding of how their votes are being counted. The Hopkins university team would agree with this sentiment; in their report they state that "elections allow the populace to choose their representatives and express their preferences for how they will be governed. Naturally, the integrity of the election process is fundamental to the integrity of democracy itself. The election system must be sufficiently robust to withstand a variety of fraudulent behaviours and must be sufficiently transparent and comprehensible so that voters and candidates can accept the results of an election" (Kohno, Stubblefield, Rubin, 3)
THEORETICAL DISCUSSION OF ELECTRONIC VOTING SYSTEMS
The criticisms made by the hacker and software community are important, "because their lifestyles push the envelope of what is both technically possible and legally allowable, hacker moral visions not only reveal broader contradictions but at times offer a critical perspective and tangible alternatives to current ethical dilemmas in the digital landscape [...]. Ranging from new, legal software licenses to illegal acts of digital transgression, hackers are already thinking through and envisioning alternatives that will be central to debates about possible digital futures" (Gabriella and Golub 272). These discussions are paramount to our society and the development of communications. It is not enough to simply develop these new mechanisms, label them innovative and then proceed to give them increasingly administrative roles in our society. We need to pause and examine what future implications these new media and communicative systems will have on our society. Electronic voting systems are an obvious example of how new technological developments are drastically altering our institutions. However, it is also important to discuss how they are altering our personal identity.
However, the case can be made that after marking a physical ballot and slipping it into a box, the same process occurs, one which is just as hidden to us as if we entered the information on a screen. However, there is something instinctually different from handing your ballot to an individual and trusting their honesty and integrity. Electronic voting systems detach us from the reality of our electoral process. When using an electronic voting system like DRE, the medium through which we express our consent is alien and disconcerting. The message is suddenly changed. It disconnects us from the system and places a technological barrier between us and our democracy; in essence, it lacks the 'humanness' that traditional electoral processes have.. At this point a question must then be asked, what is the medium's message?
Marshal McLuhan helps provide a starting point from which to answer these questions. As he famously stated, "the medium is the message because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human association and action" (McLuhan 9). The obvious message the medium of electronic voting system portrays is efficiency and convenience. However is this all the medium is achieving? Simply a more efficient and rapid process through which to calculate votes? No. "The medium is the message" (McLuhan 9), one who's allure of efficiency and convenience has led us to sacrifice autonomy over an aspect of one of central importance; democracy. Democracy is essential because it reflects values through which we identify ourselves by. Such values of freedom, independence, transparency, accountability and above all else sovereignty, determine our normative identity and consequently our society. Sovereignty may be defined as being free from the binding constraints of any man or system, and that we are free to determine our future. But with the adoption of electronic voting systems, we have begun to sacrifice these values and thus we have forfeited an aspect of our identity. While it is true that there are many technologies and mechanisms in our society that the average citizen does not fully understand, none of them compare to the importance of our electoral system. We have begun to relinquish the fundamental mechanism that determines our societies governing body and consequently we have traded our sovereignty for efficiency.
Conclusively, a future where electronic voting systems have immersed themselves so deeply into society that we may vote online from the comfort of our homes, may not be far away. However, to physically distance ourselves so far away from politics signals the death of the public sphere. Recently, there has been a new emergence of an online political community, one which, while informed, is largely sedentary and ineffectual. The famous political/communications scholars Paul Lazarsfeld and Robert Merton describe how cancerous this inaction can be for democracy and political action:
"The individual reads accounts of issues and problems and may
even discuss alternative lines of action. But this rather
intellectualized, rather remote connection with organized social
action is not activated. The interested and informed citizen can
congratulate himself on his lofty state of interest and information and
neglect to see that he has abstained from decision and action. In
short, he takes his secondary contact with the world of political
reality, his reading and listening and thinking, as a vicarious
performance" (Lazarsfeld and Merton 235).
Unfortunately, with the help of new electronic voting systems and other technologies, this critique is quickly becoming realized. Voting may soon lose its fundamental purpose, that of democratic participation. When our political system is reduced to the click of a button, one that may or may not even reflect our true intentions, our society will have become truly efficient. Unfortunately this efficiency will come at the expense of our democratic values.
Word count: 2,999
Sources
· Mass communication and American Social Thought. Oxford : Rowman & Littlefield Publichers, 2004. 235. Print.
· Kohno, Tadayoshi, Adam Stubblefield, Aviel D. Rubin, and Dan S. Wallach. Analysis of an Electronic Voting System: IEEE Computer Society Press, 2004. 3-6. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. <http://avirubin.com/vote.pdf>.
· Pros and Cons of Controversial Issues. Historical Timeline: Electronic Voting Machines and Relating Voting Technology: procon.org, 2010. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. <http://votingmachines.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=273>.
· Jones, Douglas W. A Brief Illustrated History of Voting: The University of Iowa Department of Computer Science, 2003. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. <http://www.divms.uiowa.edu/~jones/voting/pictures/#dre>.
· Milbank, Dana. Tight Race Reveals Cracks in System. Washington : Washington Post, 2000. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. <http://cache.boston.com/news/politics/campaign2000/news/Tight_race_reveals_cracks_in_system+.shtml>.
· Fischer, Eric A., and Kevin J. Coleman. The Direct Recording Electronic Voting Machine (DRE) Controversy: Congressional Research Service, 2005. 1-3. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/60725.pdf>.
· Ardizzone, Simon, Russell Michaels, and Robert Carrillo Cohen. Hacking Democracy: Home Box Office, 2006. DVD-ROM.
· McLuhan, Marshal. "The Medium is the Message" From Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. McGraw Hill, NY, 1964. 7-9.
· Gabriella Coleman and Alex Golub (2008). “Hacker practice: Moral genres and the cultural articulation of liberalism.” Anthropological Theory, 256-267
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